If transactions costs are low, the law’s assignment of a property (or other type of legal) “right” to one claimant instead of the other will not ultimately determine whether the activity in question is continued or not.  Example:  If transactions costs are low in the Fontainebleau case, who wins there will not determine whether the Fontainebleau builds its new building or not.  Do you see why?

      If transactions costs are low, a property (or other type of legal) “right” will eventually wind up in the hands of the party that values it more highly than the other – regardless of which side the law favors, initially.

      Another way to look at it:  Most of the time, legal rules simply help set the parameters for settlement negotiations, by strengthening one side’s hand and weakening the other’s.

      All of the above statements are “positive” statements – that is, either true or false, based on fact rather than opinion.  Do they suggest to you any particular “normative” conclusion about how common law doctrines “should” or “ought to” look?
 

For more on Coase and the Coase Theorem, including his 1991 Nobel Prize, go to www2.samford.edu/~medebow/web.htm and scroll down to the end of Section VIII.B.